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Abstract 
 
Dynamics of labour market dualisation have affected most Western European countries over 
the last two decades and trade unions have been often seen as conservative institutions 
protecting the interests of their core constituencies and as such contributing to labour market 
dualisation. However, empirical evidence from Italy shows that unions’ stance towards 
atypical workers has been more inclusive than the literature expected, despite the conditions 
for pro-insider policies being firmly in place, and unions have emerged as important actors in 
the organisation of social protection for labour market outsiders. By analysing unions’ 
strategies towards temporary agency workers in Italy through a disaggregated approach (i.e. 
focussing separately on salary and job protection; active labour market policies; and income 
protection), I reconcile the empirical observations that conflict with the theoretical 
expectations. I argue that unions have indeed put in place inclusive, yet selective, policies 
towards atypical workers and that unions’ identity is a central explanatory variable to 
understand the puzzling coexistence of a dualised labour market and (selectively) inclusive 
unions. Through a disaggregated identity-bound analysis of unions’ strategies, I shed new 
light on the complex relationship between labour market dualisation and the dualisation of 
social protection. In particular, findings suggest that paradoxically unions’ strategies to 
counteract labour market dualisation may be furthering the insider-outsider divide in terms of 
social protection. I also suggest that a clearer analytical distinction between labour market 
dualisation and welfare dualisation is needed in future research and that the understanding 
of unions’ strategies towards marginal workers would greatly benefit from a systematic 
disaggregated analysis of unions’ agency. 
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Inclusive unions in a dualised labour 
market? The challenge of organising labour 
market policy and social protection for 
labour market outsiders 
 
1. Introduction 
Processes of labour market dualisation have occurred almost everywhere 
across Western Europe over the last two decades (cf. Emmenegger et al., 
2012). In nearly all the largest European economies, and particularly in 
continental and Mediterranean countries, such as Germany, France (Eichhorst 
& Marx, 2010; Palier & Thelen, 2010) and Italy (Jessoula et al., 2010), labour 
market reforms have been characterised by the introduction of flexibility at 
the margin, i.e. a less regulated labour market for the new entrants without 
affecting those already in the labour market. Flexibility at the margin resulted 
in an increasing divarication between ‘traditional’ and ‘atypical’ workers, 
whereby ‘traditional’ workers enjoy higher level of job security and social 
protection, while ‘atypical’ workers are at the opposite end of the spectrum 
and enjoy considerably less protection (Davidsson & Naczyk, 2009). 
In this context, trade unions have been often seen as conservative actors 
concerned exclusively with protecting the interests of their core constituencies 
(the insiders) while letting the new entrants in the labour market (the 
outsiders) bear the adverse consequences of flexibilisation 
(Gumbrell‐McCormick, 2011, p. 197; Ebbinghaus, 2006); in particular, insider-
outsider models (cf. Lindbeck & Snower, 1984, 2001; Rueda, 2005, 2006) 
assume that unions systematically protect the interests of the insiders and 
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therefore contribute to producing and re-producing dualisation in the labour 
market. 
Against this background, this paper aims to shed light on unions’ strategies 
towards temporary agency workers (TAWs) in Italy in the first decade after 
the creation by law, in 1997, of the TAW sector. The case of Italy is interesting 
because it is particularly puzzling. Labour market dualisation is regarded as a 
highly dramatic phenomenon, having a central role in public discourse (cf. 
Simoni, 2012)   with unions traditionally considered as actors who defend the 
interests of the ‘male bread-winner’ (Graziano, 2011, p. 175). Yet, several 
accounts of Italian unions suggest that inclusive strategies towards atypical 
workers have been put in place (Leonardi, 2008b; Johnston et al., 2011; Benassi 
& Vlandas, 2015) particularly through the three confederal unions1 
establishing specific structures to represent atypical workers2 thus taking the 
most inclusive stance, i.e. that of ‘engagement’ (Heery, 2009, p. 431). 
Furthermore, trade unions have also emerged as important actors for the 
organisation of social protection of labour market outsiders (Johnston et al., 
2011). 
The research question that this paper aims therefore to answer is: How can we 
explain the coexistence of a dualised labour market and seemingly inclusive 
unions’ strategies towards atypical workers? 
In order to answer the question, I argue that unions’ strategies towards 
atypical workers need to be analysed and explained, moving beyond a                                                         1 The three confederal unions in are: CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, Italian General Confederation of Labour), CISL (Confederazione Italiana Sindacato Lavoratori, Italian 
Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions), UIL (Unione Italian del Lavoro, Italian Union of Labour). 2 The three structures for atypical workers are: NIdiL (Nuove Identita’ di Lavoro, New Labour Identities), ALAI (then FELSA, Federazione Lavoratori Somministrati Autonomi Atipici, Federation Temporary Agency Workers Autonomous Workers Atypical Workers), CPO (the UIL TEM.P@, Categoria Nazionale dei Lavoratori Temporanei Autonomi Atipici e Partite Iva, National Category of Temporary Autonomous Atypical Workers and the self-employed). 
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reliance on ‘deductively inferred hypotheses’ and ‘aggregate evidence that 
assumes and reproduces rather stylized dualistic typologies’, such as insider-
outsider models (Schelkle, 2011, p. 302). In other words, I claim that unions’ 
strategies need to be investigated in their own account – rather than inferred 
according to labour market outcomes – and examined through a 
disaggregated approach. Dualisation is usually seen as a process leading to 
insiders enjoying considerably better conditions than outsiders ‘across the 
board’, i.e. in terms of salaries, employment rights, social protection, and 
access to passive and active labour market policies (Davidsson & Naczyk, 
2009, p. 9). I argue here that a more fine-grained understanding of the 
interaction between unions’ strategies and labour market outcomes may be 
reached if the different elements just mentioned are analysed and assessed 
separately. Hence, this paper analyses Italian unions’ strategies towards 
TAWs along three axes: (i) salary and job protection; (ii) access to training; 
and (iii) income protection. 
The findings demonstrate that unions’ strategies vary significantly across the 
three axes. In particular, unions were determined – and by and large 
successful – in furthering the interests of TAWs along the first and second 
axes, while they largely refrained from protecting outsiders’ interests along 
the third axis. These findings lead to questioning the explanatory power of 
the dualisation literature building on interest-based insider-outsider models 
(Lindbeck & Snower, 1984, 2001; Rueda, 2005, 2006). On the contrary, it finds 
support for a growing strand of literature that takes unions’ identity (Hyman, 
2001) as the crucial explanatory variable to understand unions’ strategies 
towards marginal workers (cf. Benassi & Vlandas, 2015; Vlandas, 2013; 
Meardi, 2011; Marino, 2012; Pulignano & Doerflinger, 2013). 
However, the findings also have a distinctive feature vis-à-vis existing 
identity-based accounts of unions’ strategies. A disaggregated identity-bound 
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analysis of unions’ strategies sheds new light on the complex relationship 
between labour market dualisation and the dualisation of social protection. In 
particular, the findings suggest that paradoxically unions’ strategies to 
counteract labour market dualisation may be furthering the insider-outsider 
divide in terms of social protection. In other words, combining an identity-
based analysis with a disaggregated assessment of unions’ strategies allows to 
understand why unions have been inclusive in some – and arguably most – 
policy domains, but less so in others. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical 
expectations based on the literature; section 3 presents the research design; 
section 4 provides a description of the development of the TAW sector in Italy 
following the labour market reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s; section 
5 analyses unions’ strategies towards TAWs; section 6 provides an 
explanation of unions’ strategies through an identity-based perspective; 
finally, section 7 draws the conclusions and implications for further research. 
 
2. Competing theoretical expectations on unions’ 
strategies towards atypical workers: interests vs. ideas  
 
At the core of the insider-outsider theory is the analysis of ‘the behavior of 
economic agents in markets where some participants have more privileged 
positions than others’ (Lindbeck & Snower, 2001, p. 1). Building on earlier 
work (cf. Lindbeck & Snower, 1984) which was mostly concerned with 
explaining the presence of unemployment and which identified the insiders 
with the employed and the outsiders with the unemployed, the insider-
outsider divide became an analytical construct to be applied to a broader 
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variety of categories, including ‘employed versus unemployed workers, 
formal- versus informal-sector employees, employees with high versus low 
seniority, unionized versus non-unionized workers, workers on permanent 
versus temporary contracts […]’ (Lindbeck & Snower, 2001, p. 2). According 
to the insider-outsider theory, ‘[i]ncumbent workers (insiders) in the labor 
market enjoy more favorable employment opportunities than others 
(outsiders), on account of labor turnover costs (e.g. costs associated with 
hiring, training, firing, and insiders’ ability to punish underbidding 
outsiders)’ (Lindbeck & Snower, 2001, p. 1). As far as unions are concerned, it 
is claimed that unions have an incentive to protect the insiders and to discard 
the interests of the outsiders because it is precisely increasing insiders’ 
employment protection and turnover costs that allow unions to exist 
(Lindbeck & Snower, 2001, p. 25).  
The insider-outsider theory has been developed further by Rueda (2005, 
2006). In his approach, the crucial element is that insiders and outsiders have 
different and mutually exclusive interests. The former favour stronger 
employment protection legislation (EPL) whereas the latter ask for other types 
of policies, notably ALMPs. According to this approach, the two sets of 
interests are mutually exclusive and unions can therefore not devise strategies 
that simultaneously protect and represent the interests of insiders and 
outsiders. Given that insiders constitute the largest part of unions’ 
membership base, it follows that unions will tend to favour insiders and they 
will not protect outsiders. More precisely, Rueda (2006) develops the insider-
outsider framework as a model for predicting left-wing governments’ and 
unions’ choices arguing that both – and unions even more so – have an 
incentive to systematically further the interests of the insiders, who are their 
most powerful constituency. As a consequence, it is claimed that one of the 
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conditions for pro-outsiders policies to be developed is indeed that of 
‘weakening of unions’ (Rueda, 2005, p. 72). 
The crucial elements for pro-insiders policies are all present in Italy, namely: a 
rather strong union movement (Leonardi, 2008b, p. 205) and a high 
employment protection for insiders (Ferrera, 1996; Graziano, 2011, p. 176) 
leading to high turnover costs. Thus, according to the insider-outsider theory 
and consistently with the dualisation literature, we should expect Italian 
unions to be fully supportive of insiders’ interests. 
As an alternative approach to the dualisation literature, and moving away 
from preference formation rooted in rational choice, a recent body of 
literature has been analysing the implications of unions’ identity for their 
strategies towards marginal workers (cf. Papadopoulos, 2014; Marino, 2012; 
Pulignano & Doerflinger, 2013; Benassi & Vlandas, 2015). The role of unions’ 
identities has been elucidated by Hyman (2001) who argues that unions are 
caught in a tension between three ideological orientations: market, class and 
society.  
While Hyman’s analysis does not specifically address the relationship 
between unions and atypical workers, there is strong evidence that identity 
plays a role in shaping unions’ strategies towards atypical workers. In 
particular, trade unions with a class orientation are expected to be more likely 
to devise inclusive strategies towards marginal workers as class orientation 
underpins bargaining strategies aimed to increase the welfare of all workers. 
In-depth case studies establish a strong link between class orientation and the 
inclusion of marginal workers. Marino (2012) finds that Italian unions devised 
inclusive strategies towards migrant workers and ethnic minorities through a 
‘strong call for class identify’ that ‘required union (migrant) workplace 
representatives to be impartial representatives of all workers’ (Marino, 2012, 
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p. 17). In a similar vein, Pulignano and Doerflinger (2013) find in their 
comparison of unions’ strategies towards TAWs in Germany and Belgium 
that ‘the distinctive encompassing identity of Belgian unions which […] can 
be positioned between society and class’ (Pulignano & Doerflinger, 2013, p. 
4162) enables inclusive strategies towards TAWs. These findings are 
corroborated by Benassi and Vlandas (2015) through a cross-country analysis 
of unions’ strategies towards TAWs covering 14 Western European countries. 
Their findings show that class orientation is a crucial element to explain 
unions’ inclusiveness towards TAWs, particularly in Mediterranean Europe, 
where such identity is more pronounced. In other words, the class orientation 
of trade unions is seen as a crucial element that makes unions’ strategies shift 
away from rational calculations to move towards a ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
(cf. March & Olsen, 1989) informed by their identities.  
Thus, following this approach – and counter to the dualisation literature – we 
should expect Italian unionism, which is situated between class and society 
(Hyman, 2001), to develop and pursue inclusive strategies towards TAWs. 
 
3. Research design and data collection 
The research is based on a single case study, Italy, and focuses on a specific 
category of atypical workers, TAWs. Italy has been selected as case study 
since a sharp contrast between labour market dualisation and seemingly 
inclusive unions’ strategies calls for further explanation, as briefly outlined at 
the beginning. Furthermore, when placing Italian unions against the 
expectations formulated by the existing literature, we are left with conflicting 
hypotheses since the conditions postulated by both strands of literature are 
present in Italy, namely strong unions’ and high employemtn protection of 
Inclusive unions in a dualised labour market? 
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insiders should be conducive to strategies consistent with the dualisation 
literature while the class orientation of the union should be conducive to an 
inclusive outcome. The TAW sector has been selected since it provides an 
interesting example of ‘outsiders’, being ‘an important and growing industry 
in the EU […] at the heart of the “flexicurity” debate’ (Arrowsmith, 2008, p. 
52). Furthermore, TAW is the best documented segment of the atypical 
workforce in terms of data availability. 
Data has been gathered through semi-structured interviews3 carried out with 
former and current senior members of the three Italian confederal unions 
between April and July 2013. Interviewees have been selected in order to 
capture a variety of viewpoints within the unions. In particular, 
representatives from CGIL and CISL have been interviewed to investigate the 
confederal approach to the representation of atypical workers; representatives 
from NIDiL-CGIL, FELSA-CISL and UILTEM.P@-UIL have been identified to 
analyse the viewpoints of the specific structures representing atypical 
workers within the three confederal unions; finally, a FIOM4-CGIL delegate 
has been also interviewed to shed light on the stance of a federal / sectoral 
union. The majority of interviews have been held with individuals affiliated 
with CGIL, since CGIL is the union that led the debate to set up specific 
structures for atypical workers in Italy thus prompting the others to follow 
(Leonardi, 2008b, p. 211; Gumbrell‐McCormick, 2011, p. 301). Data 
triangulation has been carried out through the analysis of unions’ 
congressional documents, unions’ statements, collective labour agreements 
(CLAs), policy reports by international and national sources (e.g. Eurofound, 
EIRO, CNEL) and other relevant secondary literature. 
                                                         3 The list of interviewees is provided in appendix 4 FIOM is the CGIL federation representing the metal-working industry, which is where the largest share of TAWs are employed (IRES, 2006: 43) 
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4. Italian ‘traditional’ (un-) employment policy and the 
labour market reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
 
Two major reforms of the labour market were undertaken in Italy with the 
aim of increasing flexibility by introducing a variety of contractual forms (i.e. 
atypical work) to complement and, to some extent, replace the dominant 
model of permanent, full-time employment, which constituted – with some 
degree of approximation – the only existing form of employment since the 
1950s. The first reform, implemented in 1997, was known as the ‘Treu 
package’, and designed by a centre-left government, while the second one, the 
2003 reform inspired by the so-called ‘Biagi Law’, was passed by a centre-
right government.  
Before reviewing the content of the two reforms in closer detail and analyse 
the main features of the TAW sector that emerged from the reforms, it is 
appropriate to take a step back and provide a brief overview of the Italian 
welfare system to map the terrain upon which the reforms have been enacted. 
In particular, given the nature of atypical / temporary work, which entails, by 
definition, spells of unemployment, it is useful to shed light on the traditional 
characteristics of the Italian welfare system with respect to unemployment 
benefits and income protection measures as well as ALMPs. 
 
4.1. The traditional characteristics of the Italian system of 
unemployment benefits, income protection and ALMPs  
 
The Italian welfare state conforms to the Southern European model of welfare 
(Ferrera, 1996). The key feature of Southern European welfare states is their 
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‘“polarized” character of the protection’, which translates into ‘generous 
protection […] to the core sectors of the labour force’ and ‘weak subsidization 
to those located in the so-called irregular or non-institutional market’ (Ferrera, 
1996, p. 19). The polarisation argument is reinforced by Graziano (2011) who 
identifies ‘strong protection of workers (insiders) and weak (or non-existent) 
protection of the so-called “outsiders”’ (Graziano, 2011, p. 176) as the main 
characteristic of Italian employment and social security policy since the 1950s. 
This polarised welfare structure is accompanied by a social model built 
around the ‘male breadwinner’ featuring social expenditure heavily geared 
towards permanent workers in core sectors, as opposed to individual citizens 
(Graziano, 2011, p. 175). A prime example of the implications of this model on 
the distribution of social expenditure can be drawn by comparing Italian 
expenditure on various items of welfare state with the EU-15 average: it 
emerges a systematic above-average spending on pensions and a systematic 
below-average spending on unemployment benefits (Graziano, 2011, p. 175), 
that is a systematic prioritisation of the worker over the citizen. 
Indeed, the structure of the unemployment benefits and income protection 
systems is such that, traditionally, hardly any individual, besides permanent 
workers in core sectors, could access it (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 563). Across 
Europe, income protection systems are usually built on three pillars: a work-
related pillar which links benefits to contributions; a selective social assistance 
pillar to cover those whose have not accumulated enough contributions to 
access the earnings-related pillar; and a universal pillar providing a safety net, 
for instance through a guaranteed minimum income (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 
565).  
In Italy, however, the second and third pillars have never been developed to a 
significant extent, thus leaving income protection almost entirely run as a 
contribution-related system with high contributory requirements, and as such 
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serving essentially only those in permanent full-time employment (Jessoula et 
al., 2010, p. 565). The few exceptions to this general framework include two 
special schemes that grant benefits upon less strict conditions, and are 
targeted at other types of workers (e.g. seasonal workers), having however 
very limited coverage (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 565). As far as guaranteed 
minimum income is concerned, Italy – together with Greece – is the only 
European country that does not provide such an instrument of social 
assistance (IRES, 2009, p. 129). 
Regarding ALMPs, Italy stands out for its backwardness vis-à-vis most 
European countries. Jessoula and Vesan (2011, p. 142) note that Italy has 
traditionally displayed ‘low investment in labour market policies, with 
underdeveloped active measures’, with unions generally opposing the 
development of a comprehensive system of continuous vocational training 
that was seen as a threat to labour unity (ISFOL, 2006, p. 26). As such, ALMPs, 
and continuous vocational training in particular, did not have any place in the 
Italian employment policy mix for almost four decades, with the 1970 
Workers’ Statue explicitly envisaging school and higher education – but not 
continuous vocational training – as the only elements of workers’ human 
capital (ISFOL, 2006, p. 25). This framework changed in the 1990s, when the 
importance of introducing ALMPs in the Italian employment policy became a 
salient issue on governments’ agendas and was broadly accepted by the social 
partners. The factors that led to ALMPs becoming a far less controversial 
issue include the gradual shift towards a knowledge-based economy, the 
changing production processes, and the wide acceptance and promotion at 
EU level of ALMPs as a desirable component of labour market reforms.  
This shift from opposition to acceptance and support of vocational training on 
the part of the unions was marked by the inclusion of vocational training in 
the CLAs signed in the framework of the 1993 tripartite agreements. In the 
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same year, Law 236/93 increased the financial resources available for ALMPs 
and vocational training by devoting, among other measures, more resources 
from the European Social Fund (ESF) to this policy area (ISFOL, 2006, p. 18). 
Subsequently, in 1997, ALMPs underwent a comprehensive reform. Indeed, 
the Treu package (whose main provisions are summarised at the end of this 
section) introduced substantial measures of ‘activation’, including an overall 
re-organisation of this policy area, supported by increasing resources devoted 
to ALMPs (Jessoula & Vesan, 2011, p. 155). 
 
4.2. A summary of the labour market reforms in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s 
 
The brief overview of the traditional features of the Italian welfare system 
with respect to employment policy strongly suggests that heavy reliance on 
work-related measures, which in turn are predicated upon long and stable 
contributory histories, and an infant framework of ALMPs, make the system 
ill-suited at the outset for atypical workers (Graziano, 2011, p. 181). The 1997 
and 2003 reforms were designed and implemented against this background.  
The immediate observation on the two reforms is that, despite being 
implemented by governments of opposite stripes, they are rather similar in 
their underlying principle as they both injected a degree of flexibility in the 
labour market for the new entrants, without modifying ‘the rules for (both 
individual and collective) dismissals of workers hired with traditional 
standard contracts’ (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 575). 
The Treu package, contained in the Law 196/97 and titled ‘Norms to promote 
employment’, touches upon a variety of issues across its 27 legislative articles, 
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spanning from the introduction of new forms of employment to specific 
measures to boost the economy of less developed regions. However, there are 
two main innovations introduced by the reform that are relevant to this 
research: (i) the creation of TAW and, as a consequence, the end of public 
monopoly over placement services, giving the possibility to private agents to 
provide this service as well (articles 1 to 13); and (ii) a novel focus on ALMPs 
in general, and training in particular, targeted at both permanent and 
temporary workers (articles 15, 17 and 18) (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1997). 
Although still low by comparative standards, the Treu package led to 
significant investments in ALMPs between 1997 and 2003, with active 
measures becoming a progressing more important item of expenditure in 
labour market policies relative to passive measures5 (Jessoula et al., 2010; 
Jessoula & Vesan, 2011).  
The 2003 reform, built around the Law 30/2003 and titled ‘Mandate to the 
government on issues related to employment and labour market’, did not 
introduce substantial innovations; rather, it reads as a ‘more radical’ version 
of the 1997 reform. In particular, the concept of atypical work introduced in 
1997 became more widespread through the introduction of several additional 
forms of atypical employment, including job on-call, coordinated and 
continuous work, and occasional work (article 4). TAW is also affected by the 
2003 reform, which calls for an expansion of this form of employment by 
lifting some of the restrictions to the use of TAW established by the previous 
reform and by introducing the concept of ‘leased worker’, i.e. the possibility 
for a worker to be hired permanently by a work agency and then hired out on 
a temporary basis by companies (article 1) (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2003). 
                                                        
5 It should nevertheless be noted that, despite the sharp increase in expenditure on ALMPs following the Treu package, Italian expenditure on these measures relative to most European countries remains considerably lower (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 577). 
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It should be noted that while both reforms (de-) regulate the use of TAW and 
touch upon issues of ALMPs and vocational training for temporary workers, 
neither of them tackle significantly the issue of income protection (Jessoula et 
al., 2010, p. 573). 
 
4.3. The emerging TAW sector after the labour market reform 
 
As a consequence of the reforms, TAW became an increasingly significant 
segment of the Italian labour market. The expansion of TAW occurred in the 
broader context of a sharp increase of atypical work, which was ‘the only 
growth area of employment in Italy’ in the late 1990s (EIRO, 1999), leading to 
a constant decrease of the incidence of ‘standard’ work as a percentage of the 
overall work-force between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s (CNEL, 2006, p. 
142). In 2007, ten years after the introduction of TAW, the absolute number of 
workers in this category amounted to 594,744, representing the fourth largest 
contingent of TAWs in Europe after the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany6 (Arrowsmith, 2008, p. 4). Figure 1 shows the progression of TAW 
over time since its introduction, providing a clear picture of its rapid 
expansion in the first decade after its establishment. 
Looking at the distribution of TAW across economic sectors, it emerges that 
both ‘traditional’ sectors (e.g. manufacturing, metalworking in particular 
(IRES, 2006, p. 43) and economic sectors typical of the post-industrial 
economy (e.g. services, such as call centres) are significantly affected, as 
shown in table 1. Further, professional profiles of TAWs are fairly equally 
distributed across more and less qualified jobs, as shown in table 2.                                                         
6 It shall be noted, however, that the statistics for Italy do not make a distinction between full-time and part-time TAW thus resulting in a likely conflated figure vis-à-vis other countries where 
TAW is reported in ‘full-time equivalent’. 
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Figure 1. Size of the TAW sector (1998 – 2007) 
 Source: Ebitemp (2011)   
Table 1. Economic sector of private companies employing TAWs (2004) 
Economic sector % Agriculture 0.5 Fishery -- Mineral extraction 0.1 Manufacturing 52.4 Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 0.4 Constructions 4.9 Sales of cars, motorcycles and household appliances 14.5 Hotels and restaurants 3.7 Transport, storage and telecommunications 2.9 Monetary and financial intermediation 2.5 Real estate, IT, research and other entrepreneurial professions 12.9 Education 0.6 Health and other social services 2.0 Other public, social and personal services 2.4 
Total 100.0 Source: IRES (2006) 
 
 
Thus, in the second half of the 1990s Italian unions found themselves 
confronted with the challenges posed by the emergence and rapid expansion 
of a new type of employment, displaying very different features from the 
workers traditionally represented by the unions, and yet cutting across 
 -     100,000  
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 400,000   500,000  
 600,000  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Monthly average of TAWs employed Workers performing at least 1 day of work as TAWs over 1 year 
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various sectors and professional profiles. The next section analyses how 
unions engaged with this ‘new’ segment of the labour force. 
 
Table 2. Share of TAW according to professional profile as a percentage of total 
TAW (2nd quarter, 2005) 
Professional profile Male Female Total Intellectual professions, scientific and with high specialisation  -- 0.6 0.2 Technical professions 15.5 3.2 10.6 Clerical workers 13.0 41.3 24.1 Qualified professions in trade and services 3.7 28.5 13.5 Artisans, qualified workers and farmers 16.3 6.0 12.2 Semi-qualified workers responsible for fixed and mobile machinery 26.4 3.3 17.3 Non-qualified professions 25.2 17.1 22 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: IRES (2006) 
 
5. Identifying unions’ strategies towards TAWs: 
inclusion, more or less 
 
An immediate observation with respect to unions’ response to the birth and 
growth of the TAW sector is that the three confederal unions established 
specific organisations to represent atypical workers. In the late 1990s, NIDiL 
(affiliated to CGIL), ALAI (then renamed FELSA, affiliated to CISL) and CPO 
(then renamed UILTEM.P@, affiliated to UIL) were created. These three 
organisations, while still representing a limited number of workers in 
absolute terms, saw their membership base expanding extremely rapidly 
(Leonardi, 2008b, p. 215), and their establishment was seen as an example of 
unions’ deep commitment in searching new ways to respond to the global 
challenges faced by the new labour world’ (Leonardi, 2008b, p. 208).  
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The general organisational principle behind the establishment of these 
specific structures is that the organisation of atypical workers is best achieved 
by combining two levels of representation. The first level has to do with the 
worker’s status, regardless of the economic sector she / he is employed. This 
dimension stems from the awareness that some social policies, such as 
vocational training and income protection, are expected to be demanded by 
atypical workers regardless of their specific sectoral employment. The second 
level relates to sectoral employment, where atypical workers need 
representation to ensure that needs and instances are also understood and 
catered at the level of the work place. Organisation of atypical workers is 
therefore realised through cooperation between a (horizontal) structure, the 
union for atypical workers, and a (vertical) structure, the industry-wide 
unions (i.e. the federations).  
This combined approach is meant to widen the unions’ action by bringing 
together collective bargaining and political representation (Gottardi, 1999, p. 
653), as confirmed in an interview by a former FIOM-CGIL delegate, who 
stated that ‘there is a dimension of precariousness that has to do with the 
nature of atypical work [that NIDiL deals with], but there is also a bargaining 
dimension at the company level […]; thus when workers’ representatives are 
elected, it is also necessary to elect atypical workers so that when bargaining 
at the company level also atypical workers’ interests are catered’ (Interviewee 
B). A survey of unions’ rights held by temporary workers across Europe 
carried out by Storrie (2002) confirms the importance attached by Italian 
unions to TAWs’ representation at the work place level, reporting that in Italy 
TAWs ‘enjoy all statutory trade union rights’ (Storrie, 2002, p. 14), a rather 
infrequent feature in Europe, where several caveats preventing TAWs from 
enjoying full union rights are observed in nearly every country.  
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In terms of goals set by the three organisations, the approach is also rather 
similar. Indeed, NIDiL, ALAI and CPO have been sharing common objectives 
since their establishment. Some of these objectives are fully in line with the 
tradition of Italian unionism, whereas some others are less common to Italian 
unionism, and more broadly to countries conforming to the Southern 
European model of welfare state (Vettor, 1999, pp. 628-630).  
As far as traditional objectives are concerned, collective bargaining, aiming at 
regulating and protecting TAWs’ salary and job, stands out as a shared 
central priority among the three unions. Turning to less common objectives, 
an emphasis on ALMPs (vocational training in particular) and 
universalisation of welfare provisions (such as income support measures) can 
be found as recurrent themes in the official documents of the unions for 
atypical workers (Vettor, 1999). The next three sections will provide a detailed 
account of unions’ strategies towards TAWs in terms of, respectively, 
traditional and ‘new’ objectives. 
 
5.1. Traditional objectives: collective bargaining and the 
protection of salary and job 
 
Collective bargaining for TAWs became a central concern for trade unions as 
soon as Law 196/97 introduced TAW in the Italian labour market. As early as 
1998, i.e. roughly one year after TAW was introduced, a first CLA between 
the three confederal unions and the national organisation of temporary work 
agencies7 was signed. Collective bargaining for TAWs reflects the 
organisational structure of unions, with a degree of cooperation between the                                                         
7 The national organization of temporary work agencies, Assolavoro, covers 98% of the TAW sector (Arrowsmith, 2008: 18), thus the CLA has an extremely high level of coverage. 
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unions for atypical workers, which operate at an horizontal level and set the 
framework conditions for the whole TAW sector, and the industry-wide 
unions, that regulate specific aspects according to the economic sector where 
TAWs are employed (Eurofound, 2002, p. 19). 
The TAW CLA has been renewed twice since it was first signed, with the 2003 
and 2008 CLAs introducing some new provisions, notably the establishment 
of bilateral bodies to offer several services to TAWs (Arrowsmith, 2006, p. 35). 
However, the main principles remain those laid out in the original agreement 
in 1998. In terms of salary and job protection, two main items stand out. 
Firstly, the TAW CLA stipulates that TAWs’ salary should not be lower than 
the salary of permanent workers (CCNL, 2008, p. 49). Equality of treatment in 
terms of salary was already set by Law 196/97 and is reiterated in the various 
TAW CLAs. In addition to equality in terms of salary, the TAW CLA also 
stipulates parity between TAWs and permanent employees on a number of 
other aspects, which include ‘working hours, job classifications, overtime and 
night-time work, holidays, [and] leave’ (Arrowsmith, 2008, p. 49). Secondly, it 
is stated that after 42 (also non-consecutive) months of employment at a user 
company, TAWs must be offered a permanent position by the user company 
(CCNL, 2008, pp. 62-63). 
The industry-wide CLAs add on to these provisions by setting ceilings for the 
use of TAWs within a company as a percentage of the total work-force as well 
as by setting, for some economic sectors, more advantageous (i.e. shorter) 
timeframes for TAWs to be offered a permanent position. A survey of how 
industry-wide CLAs affect TAWs shows that every CLA has provisions in 
these respects (NIDiL, 2010), highlighting the heavy weight attached by 
unions on: (i) creating a path towards permanent employment, through 
automatic conversion from temporary to permanent employment after a 
certain period of time; and (ii) ensuring that TAW does not turn into a 
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potentially unlimited substitution to permanent employment, by setting 
ceilings for the use of TAW.   
Thus, a high degree of inclusiveness is observed when defining unions’ 
strategies towards TAWs in terms of traditional objectives of Italian unionism. 
A CGIL senior representative stated that: ‘One of the main points for us to 
accept the [Treu] Law was that CLAs at the firm level regarding salaries were 
to be applied equally to all workers, including temporary workers and TAWs, 
because we used to think back then and we still think today that there cannot 
be collective bargaining that only covers full-time permanent workers’ 
(Interviewee C). Similarly, the concern for establishing a maximum length of 
the assignment and defining a path towards job security has been a central 
issue since the early days of unions’ strategies towards TAW. A former FIOM-
CGIL senior representative declared that: ‘in many cases atypical workers’ 
main claim is that of having their contract turned into permanent’ 
(Interviewee B), a claim that unions took on board by including the above-
mentioned clauses for automatic conversion into permanent employment (cf. 
also Goslinga & Sverke, 2003 on job security as a central claim of atypical 
workers). The same conception of atypical work as a transitional step towards 
permanent employment was also reiterated by a FELSA delegate who 
declared that: ‘There is a flexible segment of the labour market; the key point 
is to ensure that they are not always the same individuals to be part of this 
segment, otherwise flexibility becomes precariousness’ (Interviewee F). 
Arrowsmith (2008, p. 51) highlights the key concerns of unions for the TAW 
sector across Europe in his comparative report and confirms that ‘length of 
the assignment’ and ‘regulation of pay equality’ are central to the activity of 
Italian unions with respect to TAW. 
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5.2. ‘New’ objectives I: ALMPs and access to training 
Several studies find that a major demand that atypical workers have is that of 
increased ALMPs, and in particular of access to vocational training (Rueda, 
2005, p. 65). Notwithstanding that ALMPs and vocational training have 
traditionally been a very marginal component of the Italian employment 
policy, unions have showed increasing interest towards this policy area since 
the early 1990s; this surge of interest affected both traditional and atypical 
workers. With respect to atypical workers, unions expressed their 
commitment to establishing a coherent system of training since the 
introduction of TAW (Vettor, 1999, p. 630; Gottardi, 1999, p. 654; Carrieri, 
1999, p. 669) and as early as 1999, senior representatives of NIDiL, ALAI and 
CPO identified training as an important service for TAWs that unions should 
organise, co-manage, and strengthen (Scarponi & Bano, 1999, p. 641). 
A landmark event in this respect was the establishment of a bilateral 
institution, Forma.Temp, jointly managed by unions and employers. This 
institution was introduced by the 1997 Treu package and set up by the 1998 
TAW CLA, with a crucial contribution provided by the social partners in 
filling the implementation vacuum left by the 1997 reform, which did not 
specify the shape that training for temporary workers should have taken in 
detail (Johnston et al., 2011, p. 357). Forma.Temp has been offering four types 
of training to TAWs since 2001: (i) basic training, which focuses on general 
skills such as foreign languages or IT literacy; (ii) professional training, to which 
most of the resources are devoted, aiming to equip workers with specific and 
technical skills that can be of immediate use at the work place; (iii) on the job 
training, aiming to (re-) align workers’ skills to those needed for her / his job; 
and (iv) continuous training, which consists of a training voucher that allows 
TAWs to attend a specific training programme of their choice (Forma.Temp, 
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2013). The number of courses offered and of individuals trained increased 
sharply from 2001 onwards, as shown in table 3. 
Table 3. Courses offered and individuals trained by Forma.Temp (2001 – 2007) 
Year Courses Individuals 
trained 2001 8,440 76,584  2002 20,557 122,577  2003 39,298  188,264  2004 38,330  207,622  2005 30,389 186,701  2006 31,180  204,153  2007 36,187  225,139  Source: Forma.Temp (2013b)   
Leonardi (2008b, p. 216) notes that ‘vocational training for the agency workers 
can be considered a good practice’. Indeed, Italian TAWs appear to be 
comparatively better off than most of their European counterparts in this 
respect. In contrast to an overall expenditure in ALMPs still lower than many 
EU countries (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 577), significant resources are invested in 
training for TAWs and a very high share of TAWs have access to training 
compared to other European countries, as shown in table 4. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of establishing a coherent system of training 
stemming from the almost inexistent tradition in this policy domain at the 
national level, a noteworthy framework of vocational training for TAWs was 
nevertheless initiated, with an important role played by the unions in setting 
up and running Forma.Temp. Thus, as far as ALMP and access to vocational 
training are concerned, unions took a rather inclusive stance towards TAWs. 
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Table 4. Overview of training programmes provided to TAWs in five EU countries 
in 2008  FR BE NL ES IT Number of trained agency workers [x 1,000] 270.0 19.6 138.7 10.9 204.2 % of trained agency workers 12.3 3.6 19.0 1.4 35.6 Number of training hours [x 1,000] 10,110 303  760 1,221 Amount invested in training by temporary work agencies [x 1,000,000] 331 4.7 35 4.8 149 Amount invested per trained agency worker (in €) 1,225.9 239.7 252.3 440.4 729.6 Source: Based on Eurociett (2010), emphases added 
 
5.3.  ‘New’ objectives II: universalisation of welfare provisions 
and income protection 
 
The analysis of unions’ strategies towards income protection of TAWs is more 
complex. As has been noted in section 4, the Italian system of income 
protection is tailored to permanent full-time workers, since access to 
unemployment benefits is only granted on a long and stable history of social 
security contributions. The commitment to reforming the welfare system in 
the direction of more income security for atypical workers is identified as a 
shared item of novelty in the programme documents of NIDiL, ALAI, and 
CPO (Vettor, 1999). Further, the reference to a more universal system of 
welfare can be also found in the confederations’ congressional documents 
from the mid-1990s (e.g. CGIL, 1996). However, as the remainder of this 
section shows, the pledge for a more universal welfare system, which tackled 
substantially the issue of income support for atypical workers, remained to a 
large extent dead letter. 
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The concrete approach taken towards income support for TAWs followed a 
somewhat similar route to that of vocational training. A bilateral organisation, 
Ebitemp, co-managed by unions and employers, was created with the aim of 
providing a number of social security services, including income support. 
However, Ebitemp’s organisation mirrors the traditional approach of Italian 
unemployment benefits schemes, notwithstanding the crucial difference of its 
target beneficiaries, namely the likely (very) short contributory history due to 
the discontinuous nature of their employment. As a result, access to income 
support is granted upon a worker having performed a certain amount of 
working days, with a very high threshold that makes the use of this 
instrument hardly accessible to any TAWs. Through Ebitemp, TAWs are 
entitled to a one-off contribution to income support of EUR 700.00, which is 
made available to those who have performed at least 132 working days over 
the last 12 months prior to the request. The effectiveness of this instrument is 
rather easily assessed: as figure 2 shows, the average number of working days 
performed by TAWs tends to fall well below the threshold for being eligible 
to income support, apart from a peak in 2000 and 2001 (Ebitemp, 2013). 
Several studies confirm the ineffectiveness of income support for atypical 
workers, which is identified as the weakest component of the framework of 
welfare. In particular, it is pointed out how ‘it is necessary to think 
thoroughly about how to introduce universal measures of income support, as 
it has been advocated for years at European level’ (IRES, 2006, p. 93) since the 
coverage of TAWs in terms of income protection is extremely low (IRES, 2009, 
p. 85).  
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Figure 2. Average number of working days per year per individual agency worker 
(1998 – 2010)  
Source: Own calculations, based on Ebitemp (2010) 
 
However, the views of unions in this respect are rather sceptical. Indeed, the 
introduction of a system of universal income support has never found a 
central place in unions’ priorities in the 1990s and 2000s. Unions’ actions were 
rather targeted at achieving other goals ‘such as (mostly resistance against) 
pension reforms, labour market competitiveness, wage negotiation and 
insurance based contributory unemployment compensation’ (Madama et al., 
2013, p. 63), and there cannot be found any exceptions to this general 
approach as far as TAWs are concerned. On this note, Tiziano Treu, the 
Minister of Labour after whom the 1997 reform is named, stated that the lack 
of a coherent system of income support was the major shortcoming of the 
reform (Marmo, 2008, p. 21).  
Thus, the analysis of the system of income protection shows how TAWs are 
largely excluded by this component of the welfare state, and that unions’ 
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strategy has been far less inclusive than with respect to salary, job protection 
and access to vocational training, where Italian TAWs are in many respects 
better off than their European counterparts. On the contrary, as far as income 
protection is concerned, (Leonardi, 2008b, p. 217) notes that ‘[t]he shortage of 
a fair and inclusive system of social protections in case of unemployment 
increases the sense of precariousness felt by Italian atypical workers with 
respect to most of their colleagues in other European countries’. 
 
6. Explaining unions’ strategies towards TAWs: a 
disaggregated perspective through the lenses of unions’ 
identity 
 
The picture that emerges from the analysis carried out in section 5 is that of a 
selective inclusiveness of unions’ strategies towards TAWs. Namely, a high 
degree of inclusiveness in the first two axes (salary, job security and ALMPs) 
is accompanied by very low inclusiveness in the third axis (income 
protection). These findings cannot be easily reconciled with the main theories 
outlined in section 2. In particular, the insider-outsider theory, which predicts 
that unions would not take on board outsiders’ prerogatives, seems to hold as 
far as income protection is concerned, but falls short of explanations for the 
inclusiveness of unions towards TAWs in terms of salary, job protection and 
ALMPs. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that all the conditions for pro-
insiders policies are in place in Italy, an equally high level of protection of 
TAWs during their periods of employment is hardly traceable anywhere else 
in Europe (EIRO, 2000, p. iii). To elucidate this point further, it is noteworthy 
that the main provisions introduced by the European Directive 2008/104/EC 
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on temporary agency work, which prompts member states to grant TAWs 
equal pay treatment, access to various services (e.g. vocational training) and 
representation at the work-place, were already all included in the first TAW 
CLA, which was signed some ten years before the Directive was passed.  
On the other hand, when specific domains of representation of atypical 
workers are analysed separately, it emerges that unions only showed a partial 
degree of inclusiveness. More specifically, highly inclusive strategies have 
been pursued with respect to the protection of job and salary as well as 
ALMPs and training. However, unions did not appear willing to compromise 
on other issues, such as the universalisation of income protection, 
notwithstanding the fact that this measure would have been greatly beneficial 
to atypical workers (Jessoula et al., 2010, p. 563). The continued support for 
insurance-based types of unemployment benefits schemes is therefore 
seemingly at odds with identity-based accounts that predict unions situated 
‘between class and society’ to pursue inclusive strategies towards labour 
market outsiders. Thus, both approaches seem to capture only partially the 
rationale behind Italian unions’ strategies towards TAWs.  
How can we then make sense of the observed selective inclusiveness? It is 
argued here that the missing ingredient in order to achieve a more complete 
explanation of unions’ strategies towards TAWs is greater reliance on unions’ 
institutional identity combined with a disaggregated analysis of unions’ 
strategies. Putting unions’ identities at the core of the analysis and looking at 
various policy domains of unions’ agency separately allows us to understand 
why unions have put in place more inclusive towards agency workers in 
some areas than in others.  
The prime building block of Italian unions’ identity is the pre-eminence of the 
confederal dimension, over the sectoral dimension (Benassi & Vlandas, 2012; 
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Leonardi, 2008a). This aspect was stressed by nearly all interviewees who 
stated that it is in the nature of a confederal union to provide an horizontal 
representation of all workers, regardless of their type of employment 
(Interviewees A, B, C, F). A CGIL senior representative stated in this respect 
that: ‘We have always refuted the insider-outsider approach for reasons that 
have to do with our ideology; we are a general confederation of labour, and 
we therefore think that labour as such must be represented, in its various 
forms, and that the interests of the labour should always be unified and 
brought to unity’ (Interviewee C). A FELSA-CISL representative, on the same 
note, declared that: ‘In our culture of representation […], the union should 
equally represent independent work, dependent work and […] atypical work 
because it is part of our cultural approach which we have traditionally had’ 
(Interviewee F).  
A second element that shapes the identity of Italian unions, and follows on 
the previous one, is their orientation ‘between class and society’ (Hyman, 
2001, p. 143), and the resulting commitment to solidarity among workers to be 
achieved by a synthesis of ‘working-class unity’ and ‘support [to] the cause of 
the weak and disadvantaged’, respectively inherited from the socialist / 
communist and catholic traditions of Italian unionism (Hyman, 2001, p. 166). 
In particular, the identity of the largest union, CGIL, which is built around 
‘the defence of workers’ rights’ (Hyman, 2001, p. 165 emphasis added) goes a 
long way in explaining why it has been observed a decreasing degree of 
inclusiveness as we move from TAWs as ‘workers’ (i.e. in the first and, to 
some extent, second axes of the analysis) to TAWs as ‘unemployed’ (i.e. in the 
third axis of the analysis). Indeed, while CGIL itself engaged in the early 
1990s in internal debates to move towards a somewhat broader focus on 
‘citizenship’ (Leonardi, 2008a, p. 5), it is noted that the concept of citizenship 
does not constitute a shift away from the centrality of work as the basis for 
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social recognition (Gottardi, 1999, p. 658). Thus what is embodied by the 
concept of citizenship is an extension of unions’ action to the entirety of 
labour, including the new typologies that were emerging in the 1990s 
(Leonardi, 2008a, 2008b), but without compromising on the centrality of work 
(and workers) as the pivotal element of unions’ agency (Gottardi, 1999).  
The point was made clear by a former NIDiL representative who stated that: 
‘A TAW, when working, is as protected as a permanent worker’ (Interviewee 
A, emphasis added); by the same token, an identity built around the worker – 
as opposed to the citizen – is what explains the lack of commitment by the 
unions in support of a more universal system of income protection, which 
was dismissed by a UIL delegate as a ‘financial support to unemployment’ 
(Interviewee G) that should be avoided.  
In turn, the parallel focus on ‘working-class unity’ (Hyman, 2001, p. 143) is the 
factor that led to a strategy focussing on creating the conditions for atypical 
work to be a stepping-stone to permanent employment through collective 
bargaining. In line with this approach, also the unions for atypical workers 
are thought of as a locus for ‘transitional’ representation (Interviewee C), 
since, a senior CGIL representative stated, ‘we keep thinking that atypical 
work cannot be seen as a stable condition for individuals, but it should rather 
be a temporary condition’ (Interviewee C).  
The quotes just proposed illustrate the central points of unions’ strategies: the 
conception of atypical work as a transitional form of employment explains 
why we found variation across unions’ strategies. Unions bargained to create 
the conditions for atypical workers to move into permanent employment, 
including setting limits to the use of TAWs and enhancing TAWs’ human 
capital acquisition. On the other hand, they were more reluctant to support 
the establishment of passive forms of income protection that would have 
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‘legitimised’ atypical work by making it a potentially stable form of 
employment, as opposed to a stepping-stone into permanent employment.  
Table 5. Identity-driven unions’ strategies towards TAWs: an overview 
Analytical 
dimension 
Collective bargaining and the protection of salary and job ALMP and access to vocational training Universalisation of welfare provisions and income protection 
Traditional 
unions’ strategy 
High importance attached to salary and job security, to be achieved through collective bargaining 
Opposition until the 1990s, then acceptance and support 
Preference for insurance-based unemployment schemes; opposition to universal schemes, such as guaranteed minimum income  
Strategy 
towards TAWs 
Equal pay guaranteed by law and collective bargaining; clauses for automatic conversion of temporary employment into permanent employment included in all CLAs 
Establishment of a bilateral entity providing training to TAWs, with high coverage in terms of percentage of TAWs trained 
Establishment of a bilateral entity to provide income support with high contributory requirements and consequent very low coverage of TAWs; opposition to guaranteed minimum income 
Outcome for 
TAWs 
Inclusion Inclusion Exclusion 
TAW’s ‘status’ 
along the 
specific 
analytical 
dimension 
Worker Worker / Job-seeker Unemployed 
 
Thus, it emerges from the analysis that Italian unions have not excluded the 
‘outsiders’ but they have not fundamentally changed their policy preferences 
to include outsiders either. Rather, they included TAWs, by and large, 
according to the traditional strategies that were applied to permanent 
workers, which are in turn shaped by their identity, as summarised in table 5.  
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7. Conclusion and implications 
 
This paper started with the aim to explain the coexistence of two observations 
seemingly at odds, namely a dualised labour market and inclusive unions, 
and argued that a fresh look at unions’ strategies towards atypical workers is 
needed to explain the coexistence of a dualised labour market and inclusive 
unions. It suggested that unions’ strategies cannot be simply inferred through 
labour market outcomes, but they rather need to be investigated in their own 
account, which entailed disaggregating the analysis of unions’ strategies 
along different dimensions and assessing them separately. In this respect, 
three dimensions have been singled out for the purposes of this research, 
namely: (i) salary and job protection; (ii) access to training; and (iii) income 
protection. The analysis of unions’ strategies towards TAWs along these three 
dimensions led to identify a pattern of selective inclusiveness, whereby unions’ 
strategies have been highly inclusive in terms of salary, job protection and 
access to training, and exclusive in terms of income protection. 
The paper argued that the observed selective inclusiveness could not be 
explained by interest-based theories, such as the dualisation literature. Rather, 
it argued that idea-based explanations, which rely on the centrality of unions’ 
identity to understand unions’ agency, provide a better starting point. 
However, it has been also pointed out that in order to fully capture the 
pattern of selective inclusiveness, an identity-based explanation needs to be 
coupled with a systematic analysis of unions’ strategies across different policy 
domains, since existing identity-based accounts of unions’ strategies seem to 
overlook the variation in unions’ strategies across policy areas. 
It has been therefore shown that, in some cases, unions pursued strategies 
precisely to counteract dualisation of the labour market and to unify labour 
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(e.g. by supporting equal pay and other measures of equal treatment for 
atypical workers and including into the CLAs clauses to ease the transition of 
atypical workers into permanent employment), whereas in other cases, 
unions’ strategies contributed to excluding atypical workers from access to 
welfare and as such contributed to a process of (welfare rather than labour 
market) dualisation (e.g. by supporting an insurance-based unemployment 
system that are to a large extent inaccessible to atypical workers). 
Thus, the paper showed that the interaction between unions’ strategies and 
labour market outcomes cannot be reduced to a binary relationship, whereby 
a dualised labour market inevitably signals exclusively pro-insiders unions. 
An in-depth assessment of Italian unions’ strategies towards TAWs showed 
that unions’ strategies are not simply a response to their core constituencies’ 
interests; rather, unions may be pursuing both inclusive and exclusive 
strategies within a dualised labour market, and that such strategic choice may 
be primarily driven by their institutional identity.  
More broadly, by providing an explanation to the coexistence of a dualised 
labour market and (selectively) inclusive unions, this research aimed to make 
two contributions. Firstly, it is suggested that dualisation is not necessarily a 
process leading to outsiders being worse off than insiders ‘across the board’. 
The case of the Italian TAW sector shows that, for instance, salary is not a 
source of dualisation, since equal pay is guaranteed by law and CLA. On the 
contrary, a highly exclusive system of income protection towards atypical 
workers stands out as a major difference in the degree of welfare and social 
protection enjoyed by full-time permanent workers and atypical workers. 
These factors may be different across countries, and a more fine-grained 
understanding of the dynamics leading to dualisation may be reached 
through a systematic disaggregated analysis, for instance by keeping separate 
the labour market and welfare state dimensions.  
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Secondly, following on the first point, unions’ strategies may be different 
across countries bearing different consequences on the degree of inclusion of 
atypical workers in the labour market and in the social protection system – or, 
indeed, in specific components of it. In this respect, this paper contributed to a 
broader research agenda that can be summarised by the following 
overarching question: ‘what determines how constructive or obstructive, 
defensive or proactive, assertive or compromising, trade unions are in 
particular policy areas?’ (Schelkle, 2011, p. 302). The case study of the Italian 
TAW sector supports the claim that reliance on ‘stylized dualistic typologies’ 
is too simplistic (Schelkle, 2011, p. 302). Indeed, this case study showed how 
unions’ strategies towards atypical workers cannot be fully assessed through 
a clear-cut framework of inclusion vs. exclusion. Rather, unions may be more 
or less inclusive in different policy domains, and their degree of inclusiveness 
may be in turn heavily influenced by their identities, which shape ‘the 
interests with which they identify,  […] the agenda they pursue, and the type 
of power resources which they cultivate and apply’ (Hyman, 2001, p. 1). 
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